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THE ARBITRATION EXCEPTION IN THIRD PARTY
LEGAL OPINIONS: DEAD OR ALIVE?
Jane B. Morgan
In the light of strong Mississippi Supreme Court opinions that support
commercial arbitration and equally strong holdings in favor of arbitration
from the federal courts, coupled with longstanding federal' and state2 arbi-
tration statutes, business lawyers in Mississippi might be tempted to forget
about taking an exception for an arbitration provision in a commercial
agreement when they deliver third-party legal opinions. Some recent cases
and commentary suggest, however, that there is still ample room for cau-
tion when issuing a remedies opinion on a commercial agreement that con-
tains an arbitration provision.'
Since the Mississippi Supreme Court rendered its decision in IP
Timberlands Operating Co. v. Denmiss Corp.,' our state Supreme Court
has clearly announced its intent to liberally construe arbitration agree-
ments in commercial settings' by confirming that "every reasonable pre-
sumption will be indulged in favor of the validity of arbitration
proceedings." 6 The United States Supreme Court and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit have been no less bashful in pro-
claiming a national policy in favor of arbitration in commercial
agreements.'
Against this backdrop, a Mississippi business lawyer might conclude it
safe to opine at closing that the transaction documents are legal, valid, and
binding without the need to include an express exception for an arbitration
1. Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-307 (West 2009).
2. Mississippi Arbitration and Award, Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 11-15-1 to -37 (1972); Arbitration of
Controversies Arising from Construction Contracts and Related Agreements, Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 11-
15-101 to -143 (1972).
3. A special report of the TriBar Opinion Committee gives the following example of a typical
remedies opinion (also known as an enforceability opinion): "The Agreement is a valid and binding
obligation of the company, enforceable against the company in accordance with its terms." The TriBar
Opinion Committee, The Remedies Opinion, 59 Bus. LAw. 1483, 1484, n.4 (2004).
4. 726 So. 2d 96 (Miss. 1998).
5. The Mississippi Supreme Court arguably has drawn a distinction between the enforcement of
arbitration agreements in commercial settings with those in consumer contracts. See East Ford, Inc. v.
Taylor, 826 So. 2d 709 (Miss. 2002) (holding consumer arbitration agreement unconscionable under
general state law principles). Because business lawyers are commonly required to issue third-party
legal opinions as a condition precedent to the closing of commercial transactions, the analysis in this
article is restricted to arbitration clauses in commercial agreements and does not address issues unique
to the enforceability of an arbitration agreement in a consumer contract.
6. IP Timberlands, 726 So. 2d at 106 (quoting Hutto v. Jordan, 36 So. 2d 809, 812 (1948)). See
also Doleac v. Real Estate Profs., LLC, 911 So. 2d 496 (Miss. 2005).
7. E.g., Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); Personal Sec.
& Safety Sys. Inc. v. Motorola Inc., 297 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2002); Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency
L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 526 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25); Neal v. Hardee's
Food Sys., Inc., 918 F.2d 34, 37 (5th Cir. 1990) ("We resolve doubts concerning the scope of coverage of
an arbitration clause in a contract in favor of arbitration").
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provision in one or more of the documents. But business lawyers beware: a
recent United States Supreme Court decision, Hall Street Associates,
L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.,' as followed by the Fifth Circuit in Citigroup Global
Markets Inc. v. Bacon,9 may suggest otherwise.
In Hall Street, the landlord (Hall Street) sued its tenant (Mattel) in
federal district court for improper lease termination and for indemnifica-
tion of environmental clean-up costs."o Following a bench trial and a failed
attempt at mediation, the parties agreed, with the district court's blessing,
to submit the environmental indemnification issue to arbitration." The
lawyers for Hall Street and Mattel drew up an arbitration agreement that
was reviewed by the district court and entered as an order.12 In an attempt
to hedge their bets against an off-the-wall decision by the arbitrator, the
lawyers crafted the now infamous judicial review paragraph:
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon may enter
judgment upon any award, either by confirming the award or by vacating,
modifying or correcting the award. The Court shall vacate, modify or cor-
rect any award: (i) where the arbitrator's findings of facts are not supported
by substantial evidence, or (ii) where the arbitrator's conclusions of law are
erroneous.1 3
The arbitrator found for Mattel.14 Hall Street, pursuant to the court-
sanctioned judicial review provision, moved the district court to vacate and
correct the arbitrator's ruling.'" After a series of remands, appeals, and
further remands and reversals among the district court, the arbitrator and
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to decide whether the grounds for vacatur and modifica-
tion provided in Sections 10 and 11 of the FAA1 6 are exclusive.
8. 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008).
9. No. 07-20670, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 4543 (5th Cir. Tex. Mar. 5, 2009, revised Mar.18, 2009).
10. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1400.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1400-01 (emphasis added).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Sections 10 and 11 of the FAA provide:
10. Same; vacation; grounds; rehearing
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein the
award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party
to the arbitration-
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of
them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hear-
ing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and mate-
rial to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party
have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that
a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
[(5) Redesignated (b)]
(b) If an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required the award to
be made has not expired, the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the
arbitrators.
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In a 6-3 opinion, Justice Souter, writing for the majority, held that the
FAA's statutory grounds for review are exclusive and cannot be expanded
by contract."In reaching its decision, the Court recognized that many fed-
eral circuits, including the Fifth Circuit in Gateway Technologies, Inc. v.
MCI Telecommunications Corp.,1" have held that parties may contract for
expanded judicial review in arbitration agreements.19 The Court put to rest
such creative drafting on the part of business lawyers, despite Justice Ste-
vens's objections:
Today, however, the Court holds that the FAA does not merely au-
thorize the vacation or enforcement of awards on specified grounds, but
also forbids enforcement of perfectly reasonable judicial review provisions
in arbitration agreements fairly negotiated by the parties and approved by
the district court. Because this result conflicts with the primary purpose of
the FAA and ignores the historical context in which the Act was passed, I
respectfully dissent.20
Notwithstanding the Court's firm prohibition against expanded judi-
cial review of arbitration awards governed by the FAA, the Court noted
that the "FAA is not the only way into court" and left open the possibility
that judicial review under state statutory or common law authorities might
differ in scope.21 With respect to the Hall Street dispute, the Court ob-
served that it never appeared to be anything but an FAA case because the
(c) The United States district court for the district wherein an award was made that was
issued pursuant to section 580 of title 5 may make an order vacating the award upon the
application of a person, other than a party to the arbitration, who is adversely affected or
aggrieved by the award, if the use of arbitration or the award is clearly inconsistent with
the factors set forth in section 572 of title 5.
11. Same; modification or correction; grounds; order
In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein the
award was made may make an order modifying or correcting the award upon the applica-
tion of any party to the arbitration-
(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident material
mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award.
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, unless it is
a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter submitted.
(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the
controversy.
The order may modify and correct the award, so as to effect the intent thereof and pro-
mote justice between the parties.
U.S.C.A. §H 10, 11 (West 2009).
17. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1401-05.
18. 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995).
19. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1403, n. 5.
20. Id. at 1408 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Kennedy, J.).
21. Id. at 1406. Mississippi's general arbitration statute contains provisions similar in substance
(but not identical) to §§ 10(a) and 11 of the FAA. Sections 11-15-23 and 11-15-25 of the Mississippi
Code provide:
§ 11-15-23. Vacation of award; grounds.
Any party complaining of an award may move the court to vacate the same upon any of
the following grounds:
(a) That such award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(b) That there was evident partiality or corruption on the part of the arbitrators, or any
one of them;
(c) That the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing
upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent or material to the
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lease at issue was a contract "involving commerce," as required by Section
2 of the FAA.22 In addition, the Court mentioned, but left unanswered, a
final question: whether the Hall Street arbitration agreement, which was
entered into in the course of district-court litigation, could have been en-
forced as an exercise of the district court's case management authority
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16.23
Since Hall Street, at least five federal circuit courts (including the Fifth
Circuit) and a number of state appellate courts 2 4 (but not including any
Mississippi courts) have addressed whether "manifest disregard of the
law," the old stalwart for vacating an arbitration award, remains viable
under the FAA. The Fifth Circuit recently overruled its previous precedent
and held that manifest disregard, ". . .a term of legal art, is no longer useful
in actions to vacate arbitration awards" under the FAA.2 5 In dictum, the
First Circuit concurred with this conclusion in Ramos-Santiago v. United
Parcel Service,26 but the Second and Ninth Circuits each held that manifest
disregard survives Hall Street because the term is a shorthand for the statu-
tory grounds in Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA." The Sixth Circuit, in an
controversy, or other misbehavior by which the rights of the party shall have been
prejudiced;
(d) That the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or that they so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final, and definite award on the subject matter was not made.
§ 11-15-25. Correction of award.
Any party to the submission may also move the court to modify or correct the award in
the following cases:
(a) Where there is an evident miscalculation of figures, or an evident mistake in the
description of any person, thing, or property referred to in such award;
(b) Where the arbitrators shall have awarded upon some matter not submitted to them,
nor affecting the merits of the decision of the matter submitted;
(c) Where the award shall be imperfect in some matter of form, not affecting the merits
of the controversy, and when, if it had been a verdict of a jury rendered in such court, the
defect could have been amended or disregarded by the court.
Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 11-15-23, 11-15-25 (1972).
22. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1407. Section 2 of the FAA provides: §2. Validity, irrevocability, and
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate. "A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out
of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement
in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or
refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2009).
23. Id.
24. Noting that the U.S. Supreme Court "left the door ajar" in Hall Street, the California Su-
preme Court concluded in Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., that the Hall Street majority did
not intend "to declare a policy with preemptive effect in all cases involving interstate commerce." 190
P.3d 586, 599 (Cal. 2008). The California Supreme Court explained that it read Hall Street as being
limited to the review of arbitration awards under the FAA and did not require state arbitration laws to
conform with its limitations. Id. Interpreting the California Arbitration Act, the court held that par-
ties may obtain judicial review of the merits of an arbitral award by express agreement. Id. at 589. The
analysis in Cable Connection may provide some insight to lawyers faced with the challenge of drafting
an arbitration clause under state law that side-steps the pitfalls of Hall Street.
25. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc. v. Bacon, No. 07-20670, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 4543 at 1 (5th
Cir. Tex. Mar. 5, 2009) (majority opinion by Jolly, J., joined by Barksdale, J. and Haynes, J.).
26. 524 F.3d 120, 124, n.3 (1st Cir. 2008).
27. Stolt-Nielsen SA v. Animal Feeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 93-95 (2d Cir. 2008); Comedy Club
Inc. v. Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir. 2009).
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unpublished opinion, concluded that it would be imprudent to cease vacat-
ing arbitration awards made in manifest disregard of the law.28
In addition to the federal circuit courts' disagreements over contrac-
tual attempts to expand judicial review, one commentator has entered the
debate and offered an Article III constitutional analysis which concludes,
in sum, that the manifest dis regard doctrine i necsry to preserve a lim-
ited role for the federal courts in an arbitration scheme, thereby saving
arbitration from constitutional infirmity.2 9 Under this analysis, arbitration
clauses that expand the scope of judicial review should be enforceable and
those that limit grounds for judicial review should be unenforceable.3 0
Where does all this litigation and controversy leave the humble opin-
ion-giver who is just trying to close a deal? The simple lesson of Hall Street
may be that an opinion-giver better know the FAA and the applicable state
statutes inside and out before commenting on the enforceability of an arbi-
tration provision in a transaction that involves interstate commerce. For
those not so sanguine as to presume infallible their FAA and state law
expertise, the better approach may be to include an exception in the reme-
dies opinion for the arbitration clause, particularly in those cases where the
arbitration provision reflects a negotiated expansion of statutory provisions
such as the limitations on judicial review.
28. Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., No. 07-1830, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 23645 at 419 (6th
Cir. Nov. 14, 2008).
29. Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration and Article III, 61 VAND. L. REv. 1189, 1225-28 (2008).
30. Id. at 1227-28.
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